One September 3rd, 2009, 22-year old Specialist Jordan Shay was killed in Baqubah, Iraq.  A week and a half before he died, he tweeted: “back in iraq for round two, probably won’t fire a shot in anger all tour. sucks.”

A few days later, Shay updated his blog. He wrote about the Sweet Tarts he gave to the local kids, the pictures he snapped with Iraq soldiers, the cluelessness of his “blundering platoon leader,” and his hope for this tour — shootouts or not.

We are respected in Baqubah. We are also feared. Our battalion has a fantastic opportunity to use these facts to our advantage and make a real difference before the withdrawal of all combat forces in the summer of next year. We made a difference in 2007, we could do it again in 2009. I fear we will not.

Then, on the way back from a mission, Shay’s armored vehicle rolled over and fell 60 feet from a bridge.

Shay is one of a half-dozen troops who perished in recent years, but whose words still remain online. On Memorial Day, take a few minutes to read through the blogs of service members like Shay, Sergeant Christopher Abeyta, Captain Jenna Wilcox, and Major Andrew Olmstead.

This morning I had the opportunity to testify before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations on the topic of “Anti-Money Laundering: Blocking Terrorist Financing and Its Impact on Lawful Charities.

Non-profit organizations are especially susceptible to abuse by terrorists and their supporters for whom charitable or humanitarian organizations are particularly attractive fronts. Here is a selection from my testimony:

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) – the multilateral body that aims to set global standards for anti-money laundering and counter-terror financing – has found that “Terror networks often use compromised or complicit charities and businesses to support their objectives.” In fact, FATF warned that “the misuse of non-profit organizations for the financing of terrorism is coming to be recognized as a crucial weak point in the global struggle to stop such funding at its source.”

According to the Justice Department, intelligence indicates that terrorists continue to use charities as sources of both financial and logistical support. British officials concur. According to a joint UK Treasury/Home Office report, a “significant proportion” of terror finance investigations in the UK over 2006 included analysis of links to charities. The report found that “the risk of exploitation of charities is a significant aspect of the terrorist finance threat.”

Most charities are completely law-abiding, praiseworthy organizations. But among the minority of charities engaged in supporting terrorism, some are founded with the express purpose of financing terror, while others are infiltrated by terrorist operatives and supporters and co-opted from within. Treasury designations of entire charity tend to focus on the former. Never has the government targeted unwitting donors.

One reason the charitable sector remains vulnerable to terrorist financing according to FATF, is that charities are subjected to lesser regulatory requirements than other entities, such as financial institutions or private companies.

The US has been largely alone in cracking down on abuse of charities and NGOs by Islamist militant groups. Many other countries have been reluctant to take any steps to tackle this problem, often out of concern that they will appear to be targeting Muslim humanitarian efforts.

Despite some criticism, the U.S. government has been consistent in its efforts to protect the donor public and stem the flow of funds to terrorists by cracking down on the abuse of the charitable sector by terrorist organizations. The Treasury Department has designated more than 40 charities with ties to designated terrorist groups, a few with branch offices in the U.S. The U.S. has also prosecuted charities and their leaders, such as in the case of the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) which was found guilty on all counts in November 2008.

In none of these cases was U.S. government action capricious or based on sparse, dated, or unreliable information. The designation process in particular, I know from first hand experience, is appropriately robust, vigorous and errs on the side of caution. Designated entities can and do appeal their designations, and the Treasury Department has a record of lifting designations when warranted.

It should be clear that charities and international aid organizations come to this problem set from a noble and well intentioned perspective focused on the need to highlight opportunities to facilitate quick, efficient and timely aid. Thankfully, promoting opportunities for charitable giving and reducing the risk those opportunities are abused for illicit purposes are in no way mutually exclusive goals.

Unfortunately, there are those who insist otherwise. They stress that due diligence on the part of charities is difficult and costly, and insist it has only limited value. In fact, the real question of the day is how to most effectively streamline due diligence and make it more cost effective. There should be no debate over the basic threshold for harmonizing charity and security: a basic commitment to non-violence.

Balancing the risk of violence and the opportunity for charity, government and the non-profit sector both have a responsibility to err on the side caution. Both also have a responsibility to work cooperatively to thaw the chilling effect that the government’s public response to terrorists’ abuse of charities has had on charitable giving within the United States, and within Muslim-American communities in particular.

The problem is not enforcement of U.S. laws banning material support to terrorist organizations (indeed, in the history of Treasury’s designation regime only a handful of U.S. based charities have been designated), but rather the unintended impact this has had on charitable giving. Greater due diligence on the part of non-profit organizations, combined with government outreach and information campaigns such as Treasury’s “Updated Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines: Voluntary Best Practices for U.S.-Based Charities,” would go a long way toward resolving this problem.

My full, written testimony is available here.

I have not had time to write much recently, but two recent events point to the increasingly overt ties between the Chávez government and international terrorist organizations.

The first, Chávez’s help bring the FARC in Colombia and the Spanish ETA together,, I already discussed at some length here.

New revelations are now being published about Chávez’s direct (although repeatedly denied) ties to Hezbollah and other radical Islamist groups. A new book, “El Palestino,” by Spanish journalist Antonio Salas documents armed camps in Venezuela where the FARC, Hezbollah, ETA and others all train together.

In the book, which comes out later this week, the author says he posed as a Venezuelan Palestinian interested in jihad and ended up traveling around the world after fabricating a new identity. His employer, Antena 3 of Spain, has released some of the hidden camera video he shot to verify his experience.

According to the book’s publicity, “It was in Venezuela that he received his baptism of fire. He found that just around the city of Caracas there are six terrorist training camps. There he learned to shoot every kind of weapon. His time there coincided with the training of members of the FARC, ETA and other groups.”

There have long been reports of these camps from credible sources, but video and direct, publicly available documentation and first hand experience has not been. This is in keeping with Chávez’s broader goals of creating an alliance of state and non-state actors to wage asymmetrical warfare against the United States. It is, quite likely, the worst of all worlds for the rest of Latin America, and beginnings of the solidifying joint venture that will eventually pose and existential threat to the United States.

Both Chávez, with the FARC, and Iran with its Hezbollah proxy, have the same goal in this endeavor. Each of the proxies has relevant experience and resources the other does not, and both have a long history of adaptation and co-learning from other terrorist groups, regardless of political/theological differences.

Chávez has also made no secret of his desire to spread armed revolution across Latin America to rid the continent of non-Bolivarian governments, or transform the governments to the Bolivarian way.

Hence his support, through the Movimiento Bolivariano Continental, (Continental Bolivarian Movement), to the FARC, the Tupac Amaro movement in Peru, the Mapuches and MIR in Chile, etc. etc.

This support is likely to increase as Chávez’s internal situation deteriorates. With the highest homicide rate in the hemisphere, water and electrical rationing, inflation running at more than 30 percent and his popularity in a steady decline, he is likely to be desperate for anything that can give him a boost.

Iran, Cuba, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Ecuador have enormous stakes in Chávez’s survival, no matter what the cost. So one can expect the region to be roiled by something he cooks up to fabricate a crisis.

The U.S. response so far has been muted to Chávez and his lethal alliances. There are no good options for a response, but it is increasingly clear that the day of reckoning is drawing near.

Publication: Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 100 May 24, 2010

The draft resolution on new sanctions against Iran introduced by the US at the UN Security Council last Tuesday has caught Moscow in a trap set primarily by its own unprincipled diplomatic maneuvering. On previous occasions, Moscow tried to reconcile the pragmatic bargaining with the US and its “good-neighborly” partnership with Iran, but now the intrigue is far more complicated. Russian-Iranian relations have visibly shrunk, even if Rosatom still promises to launch the Bushehr nuclear power station in August (RIA Novosti, May 20). A new dimension in the protracted international controversy around the Iranian nuclear program was opened by the trilateral deal involving Brazil and Turkey that was announced in Tehran last week. The technicalities of the swap are yet to be presented to, and approved by, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but the substance is clear: Iran entrusts 1200 kilograms (kg) of its low-enriched uranium to Turkey for safe-keeping and receives 120 kg of highly-enriched uranium from Brazil (Kommersant, May 18; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 19).

This deal does not slow down uranium-enrichment activities in Iran, consequently pressure from the UN would be entirely justified, but Russia has agreed to execute new ‘smart’ sanctions (which are certain to have zero impact on Iranian nuclear ambitions) primarily in order to proceed with the “reset” in relations with the US. Washington has indeed lifted its unilateral ban on contacts with several Russian companies and colleges (including Rosoboronexport) suspected of contributing to missile and nuclear projects in Iran (www.newsru.com, May 22). Moscow, has granted support to the Turkish-Brazilian initiative, perhaps never expecting it to succeed because its own proposals had failed. Neither Turkey nor Brazil is gravely concerned about Iran accessing advanced nuclear technologies, but both countries are eager to boost their international prestige by succeeding in resolving a pivotal and intractable issue (www.gazeta.ru, May 20). They have good reasons to be proud of their achievement, but the US demand for sanctions clearly devalues it and Moscow’s support for the draft resolution amounts, in their eyes, to a betrayal of trust.

This diplomatic blunder is undeniably personal because President, Dmitry Medvedev, had persistently sought to become involved in the talks. He discussed the Iranian issue with Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, while visiting Turkey on May 12-13, then called US President, Barack Obama, and greeted in Moscow the Brazilian President, Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, who was bracing himself for 18 hours of hard bargaining in Tehran. It is impossible to fathom what kind of suggestions and promises Medvedev gave his counterparts, but it is known that Erdogan called Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin ,on May 19 seeking to secure more meaningful support for the swap deal. Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, now tries to convince his US counterpart, Hillary Clinton, that the atmosphere has become favorable for resuming political efforts, but Washington is adamant on a new resolution (despite objections from Brazil and Turkey) and Russia cannot retreat from its consent not to use its veto (Vremya Novostei, May 20).

Whatever the outcome of the unusually multi-polarized debates in the UN Security Council, it is already clear that in Russian foreign policy this duplicity (or perhaps even triplicity) is not an isolated episode, but a feature determined by its new “pragmatism.” Two weeks ago a draft guideline-setting document from the foreign ministry was leaked to the media and emphasized a pronounced shift in priorities towards improving relations with many partners and abandoning a confrontational stance (Russian Newsweek, May 9). The main thrust of the foreign policy, according to this “doctrine,” is on securing external involvement in Russia’s modernization, and many recent compromises, such as the rapprochement with Poland and settling the maritime border dispute with Norway, appear to fit this pattern. Medvedev has indeed adopted a “smiles-and-smooth-talking” style, which contrasts positively with Putin’s often terse and caustic behavior (The Moscow Times, May 19). The key proposition beneath these stylistic differences, however, is that the global crisis has undermined the US leadership and eroded the EU cohesion –and thus has created new opportunities for Russia that must be carefully exploited in a cooperative rather than confrontational climate (Ezhednevny Zhurnal, May 20).

This proposition is not without rational assessment, particularly as far as the consequences of the deeper than expected crisis in the EU structures of governance are concerned, but it underestimates the scope of Russia’s own weakening and marginalization. Moscow could have perhaps acquired a new position of strength –in “soft power” terms– vis-à-vis Ukraine, which has suffered a near catastrophic economic contraction and cannot count on any “rescue packages” from the EU or US (Nezavisimaya Gazeta, May 20). Russia cannot, however, project any meaningful influence even in Central Asia, where the implosion of Kyrgyzstan could be merely the beginning of the end for despotic regional stability (Vremya Novostei, May 21). Imagining Russia as one of the “emerging powers” on a par with Brazil or India, the makers of Medvedev’s foreign policy remain in denial of the profound crisis of its state fundamentals.

Current economic statistics show the picture of an uncertain recovery, but perhaps the most telling figure is the sustained decline in foreign investments, which has registered a five-year low in the first quarter of 2010, and the high level of “capital flight,” primarily to Switzerland (Vedomosti, May 21). This may be the most definite “litmus test” of Medvedev’s opportunistic foreign policy, in which flexible tactical maneuvering brings a sustained erosion of trust. Spinning the discourse of “innovations” Medvedev is in fact presiding over Russia’s continuing de-modernization, determined not by the high profitability of raw materials extraction and export, but by the bureaucratic super-structure that expropriates and consumes these profits. The unavoidable tightening of budget expenditures in the political system based on rent-extraction and glued together by corruption would lead to both more ruthless predation and more destructive clan feuds. In this situation, a policy of exploiting other states’ troubles guarantees that your own troubles would also be seen as someone’s opportunities.

Publication: Jamestown Foundation Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 7 Issue: 98 May 20, 2010 

The Russian authorities are seeking a major détente with the West. A draft of a revised foreign policy doctrine was leaked and extracts published by Russky Newsweek in Moscow this month. The document was prepared by the foreign ministry and envisages closer political cooperation with the US and the West in exchange for much needed Western capital and technologies to kick-start Russian modernization in all fields, including defense. The document was prepared by the foreign ministry in February and provisionally approved by President, Dmitry Medvedev. Diplomats told Newsweek that since February the draft has been in the hands of the government, where Russia’s Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, has his own personal foreign office run by Yuriy Ushakov, the former ambassador to Washington (EDM, May 19).

Medvedev is essentially a figurehead president and Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, who supervised the writing of the draft, is equally not a particularly influential figure in Moscow. Ushakov, in turn, is not liked in the foreign ministry. The leak of the draft to Russky Newsweek is the apparent result of Moscow’s inter-departmental rivalry and intrigue. However, it is increasingly clear that a revolutionary change in Russian foreign policy is indeed occurring and the entire leadership, including Putin, is behind the move.

This week, in Washington, during a briefing in the Russian embassy Deputy Prime Minister, Sergei Ivanov (in charge of defense and defense industry), told Russian reporters that cooperation with the US is improving (Interfax, May 18). Ivanov is close to Putin, in 2007 he was considered a frontrunner to become president before Putin chose Medvedev to be promoted as his official successor. It is known in Moscow that Medvedev and Ivanov do not particularly like each other. Ivanov’s reportedly glowing endorsement of further US-Russian cooperation is a clear sign this is a Putin-approved policy shift.

In Washington, Ivanov met with US Defense Secretary, Robert Gates, Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, Assistant Secretary of State, William Burns, and National Security Advisor, James Jones. Officially, Ivanov’s visit was primarily to promote space cooperation with NASA, but he told reporters that much more was discussed, including Iran, Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) cooperation, WTO membership and encouraging US investment and technology transfers. Ivanov was upbeat on further cooperation in all fields and announced that Moscow has offered to work with the US on the joint production of the An-124 Ruslan heavy military transport aircraft. Today An-124’s made in Russia and Ukraine in the 1980’s and 1990’s are chartered by the Pentagon and other NATO militaries to carry heavy and bulky cargos to Afghanistan. With the Russian defense industry in deep crisis, Russia and Ukraine have lost the capability to produce new Ruslans and until now all attempts to restart production in Russia or jointly with Ukraine have failed, despite Putin declaring it a national priority. Ivanov announced a joint venture with the US air industry that could share know how and make modernized An-124 planes for the Russian military, the Pentagon and for commercial cargo airlines. According to Ivanov, “the Pentagon is looking into the matter.” Ivanov announced: “We must travel a long way, but I sincerely hope if true business interests unite us, security problems will be seen in a totally different light” (Interfax, May 18; Kommersant, May 19).

In another sign of growing friendship, Russia’s UN Ambassador, Vitaly Churkin, supported a draft UN Security Council resolution proposing new sanctions against Iran despite the last ditch attempt by Tehran to deter the vote by signing an agreement brokered by Turkey and Brazil to send some enriched uranium abroad in return for fuel rods for a medical research reactor (Kommersant, May 20). The Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who adamantly opposes new sanctions, is reported to have telephoned Putin to ask for help (RIA Novosti, May 20). The UN draft calls for an embargo on the sale of offensive heavy weapons to Iran such as tanks or fighter jets. The draft apparently avoids restricting the sale of antiaircraft missiles like the S-300 Russia has promised Iran, but withheld until now. Russia is a major arms supplier to Iran and any restrictions would be unpopular in Moscow’s powerful arms trading community. If Putin rebuffs Erdogan and allows new sanctions to pass in the UN, this would be seen in Moscow as a major concession that Washington would be expected to match.

The Russian military, supported by Putin and Medvedev, is ready and eager to buy Western weapons and to create joint ventures to co-produce on Russian soil. Russia is transforming from a global to a regional power with dominating limited regional interests. Moscow wants to dominate the post-Soviet space and use in time of need a sophisticated and disciplined military force that could project power primarily using high quality and better equipped units. Israel and France are important military-technical partners in this transformation, with Italy, Germany and now the US invited to join.

Putin, and Medvedev, seem to be genuinely interested in finding an enduring understanding with the West and settling outstanding differences on the solid basis of carving up Eurasia into clear zones of dominance and a written code of conduct (a proposed revised European security code). The resolution of the long-standing territorial dispute with Norway, the sincere Russian effort to upgrade its relations with Poland and put past differences to rest –all happening last month– are good examples of Moscow’s new strategic thinking. Russia is extending an open hand to the West, offering each side the opportunity to pursue their interests without hindrance in its sphere of interest. A number of major Western nations like France, Germany, Italy and maybe the US are seen in Moscow as sending signals they are tacitly ready to accept Russia’s special regional role.

The security situation in Kyrgyzstan seems to be deteriorating with rebels threatening a civil war that may undermine the Moscow-backed provisional government (Interfax, May 19). In the worst case scenario, Russia may see itself obliged to intervene as an armed peacekeeper. The Western reaction to this, or any other possible future Russian involvement in the post-Soviet space, may determine the success or failure of the new détente and the outcome of Iranian-connected diplomatic maneuvers.

Palantir’s 5th Government Conference was a huge success with over 1,000 guests in attendance. Attendees represented many communities of interest, including defense, intelligence, law enforcement, and finance to name a few.

Videos of the first four conference presentations are now available. Due to popular demand for these videos, this special preview of presentations has been made available ahead of the rest of the day’s content. An announcement will be made here when the remainder of the conference sessions are available. The complete conference agenda has also been made available for reference.

The next Palantir Government Conference is coming in October 2010. Details will be available in the coming months.