Terrorist Iran and Atomic Iran

On 1 March 2011, the Pentagon announced it was sending the USS Monterey – a vessel equipped with the sophisticated Aegis radar system, capable of protecting Europe from a potential Iranian nuclear missile strike – to the Mediterranean. The guided missile cruiser is the first part of a missile shield announced by the Obama administration in 2009.Its deployment comes one week after the Vienna-based International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) released a notably outspoken report on Iran’s nuclear activities and lack of cooperation with inspectors operating under the UN Security Council’s mandate.

Issued on February 25, the report appears to agree, at least in part, with the conclusions of a new US National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iran, about which members of Congress and their staff were briefed a week earlier.

Together, the reports paint a picture of Iran persisting in its controversial nuclear activities despite international concern, although the US report suggests that sanctions and sabotage have slowed the program.

New NIE

The latest NIE reportedly revises the conclusions of a controversial 2007 NIE on Iran, which argued that the regime had halted its clandestine work on a nuclear weapons program. When the 2007 estimate’s “key judgments” were declassified and released, they offered a starkly different perspective than the message emanating from the Bush White House, which had been emphasizing a growing Iranian threat.

Yet public perception of the 2007 NIE largely ignored one of its other key findings: that Iran was continuing to develop uranium enrichment technology.

In the absence of a civilian need for such technology, this finding suggested that enriched uranium was being produced for nuclear weapons.

The new NIE remains classified and is only available to a limited readership in government. Yet the US media, quoting sources in Congress, has offered a glimpse of one of the estimate’s main conclusions: Although Tehran has yet to make a strategic decision on whether to build a nuclear weapon, it is developing the unspecified components of a bomb, itself a complicated engineering challenge.

Tougher IAEA Report?

The quarterly IAEA reports are intended to record the agency’s progress in persuading Tehran to convince the world that its nuclear activities are for peaceful purposes.

This is a diplomatic obligation for Iran as a signatory of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. In addition, mandatory provisions of several UN Security Council resolutions oblige Tehran to cooperate with IAEA inspectors.

Progress has been slow at best, but under the leadership of Director-General Yukiya Amano, who took over from Mohamed El Baradei in late 2009, the quarterly reports have indicated a tougher IAEA approach to Iran.

The February 25 report noted the following:

• Contrary to Security Council resolutions, Iran has not suspended its uranium enrichment activities at several facilities, which are under IAEA safeguards. Indeed, enrichment activities have been expanded at both a pilot plant and the main plant at Natanz, and at an enrichment plant called Fordow, near the holy city of Qom.

Tehran admitted the existence of the latter facility in 2009, days before it was revealed by US and European surveillance. Indeed, Iran is enriching with more than 5,000 centrifuges, 1,000 more than three months ago. (A rare optimistic note is that Iran’s total of 8,000 centrifuges is slightly less than the total at the time of the last report, suggesting breakdowns remain a problem.)

• Iran has now produced more than 3,600 kilograms of low-enriched uranium; if processed into higher proportions of the fissile isotope U-235, this could theoretically be enough for several atomic bombs. In addition, Iran continues to enrich some of this to a higher (20 percent) proportion of U-235, a cause for concern because anything beyond is defined as highly enriched uranium (HEU).

Iran is also working on two new centrifuge designs that might be more efficient than its problematic IR-1 centrifuge.

• Iran is not responding to information requests about the Fordow plant and has yet to tell the IAEA anything about 10 new centrifuge plants. Sites for five of these plants have already been chosen, and construction will begin on one of them before the Iranian new year (March 20) or shortly afterward.

• Iran has provided no further information regarding its claim last year that it possessed laser enrichment technology, nor on its later announcement that it was developing a new type of centrifuge. The regime has also ignored IAEA requests about additional locations related to the manufacture of centrifuges and research and development on enrichment.

• Although Iran has stated that it is not working on reprocessing – which the IAEA confirmed, but only in the facilities it was permitted to inspect –the regime continues to work on heavy-water projects in violation of Security Council resolutions.

• Some activities at the Isfahan uranium conversion and fuel manufacturing facilities contravene Iran’s international obligations.

• Under a section titled “Possible Military Dimensions,” the IAEA report refers to “new information recently received” as well as concerns “about the possible existence in Iran… of activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile.”

This disturbing conclusion reinforces previous evidence that Iran is working hard to design a nuclear weapon small enough to fit on top of a missile less than three feet in diameter. It also suggests that Iran intends to design an implosion-type device, which is more challenging than the gun-type design used in the Hiroshima bomb and later developed by apartheid-era South Africa. Nuclear devices for missiles must also be more durable than those dropped from aircraft because they need to cope with the huge acceleration and high reentry temperatures associated with rocket launches.

(The IAEA report also notes that Iran has had to delay the start-up of the Russiandesigned Bushehr civil nuclear power reactor because of unspecified problems requiring the unloading of the uranium fuel rods. The New York Times subsequently reported a problem with the reactor’s cooling pumps.

Although Bushehr is not an immediate proliferation concern, its personnel need many of the same skills required for the controversial portions of Iran’s nuclear program.)

Tehran’s Nuclear Intentions

Iran’s nuclear progress has been extraordinarily slow. Using technology similar to Iran’s, Pakistan needed eight years to reach the testing stage in the 1970s and 1980s. Iran is believed to have been working on nuclear weapons since the mid-1980s, or roughly 25 years. Some of the delay can be attributed to poor administration, but the technical challenges and the disruption of needed imports of material and equipment have also contributed to the slowness. The reported, and perhaps unreported, incidents of sabotage have probably played a role as well.

The US sees this delay as confirmation that its sanctions policies are working, while also claiming that Tehran has yet to make a “strategic decision” on whether to move from the technical ability stage to actually making a testable device. Yet it is difficult to reach the same optimistic conclusion from reading the IAEA report, and it makes the deployment of USS Monterey seem unnecessary.

Much of the confidence that Iran remains unable to make a nuclear device rests on the knowledge that its IR-1 centrifuge has never been successfully used to make the required 90 percent HEU needed for a deliverable atomic bomb. Iran’s attempts to develop two new centrifuge types, known as IR-4 and IR-2M, could be beyond the regime’s technical skills. Given Tehran’s relations with Pyongyang, however, Iran could obtain access to advanced P-2 centrifuges, which were revealed to be operating in North Korea last year.

Pakistan has used this type of centrifuge to develop enough HEU for as many as 100 atomic bombs.

Tehran is still refusing to engage in any meaningful dialogue with either the IAEA or the international community – the January talks in Istanbul between Iran and the P5+1 (US, Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany) failed to make any progress. Meanwhile its nuclear decision-making is likely being affected by the popular demonstrations sweeping the Arab world, which it probably sees as distracting Washington and weakening the US position in the region. The resultant higher oil prices will certainly compensate Iran for the effect of trade sanctions.

Both the IAEA report and the new NIE should serve as reminders not to become complacent about the threat of a nuclear Iran.

Publication: Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor Volume: 9 Issue 5: February 4, 2011 04:31 PM

The return of Muqtada al-Sadr to Iraq after more than three years of self-imposed exile and his unexpected January 21 departure for Iran only two weeks later have provoked speculation over the security implications of his activities in Iraq and his precise relations with Iran (Fars News Agency, January 22; Gulf News January 21; Tehran Times, January 23). In light of a recent series of terrorist attacks in the shrine-city of Karbala during the Arbain religious festival (marking the passage of 40 days after the anniversary of the death of Imam Hussein), al-Sadr’s departure has raised concerns about the Sadrist militia and the possible re-emergence of the sectarian conflict that engulfed the country in 2006-2007 (al-Jazeera, January 21; IRNA, January 25). In many ways, the spate of bombings can be seen as the latest attempt by the Sunni militant factions to incite sectarian friction and perhaps provoke the Sadrists to retaliate. However, the security breakdown which followed with al-Sadr’s surprise departure to Iran could also be an indication of the extent to which the Sadrist movement as a political-military force continues to undergo a major organizational transformation, with its leadership base becoming more entrenched in Iran.

An Unexplained and Hasty Departure

From the perspective of his opponents, al-Sadr’s sudden trip to Iran can be explained in terms of evading legal proceedings related to the assassination of Sayyid Abdul Majid al-Khoei, a prominent Iraqi Shi’a scholar who was killed by a mob (believed to be followers of al-Sadr) at a Baghdad mosque in 2003.  It was after the issuing of a warrant for al-Sadr’s arrest in connection with the murder that his Mahdist militia came to his defense and engaged in a bloody war against U.S. and Iraqi government forces. Upon al-Sadr’s return to Iraq, the family of al-Khoei challenged the Iraqi government over its failure to detain the young cleric, accusing some members of the parliament and the judiciary of purposely avoiding enforcement of the criminal investigation process (Asharq al-Awsat, January 6). Al-Sadr’s supporters, however, argue that their leader left Iraq because of American attempts to assassinate him (Fars, January 22). According to one of his top representatives, al-Sadr left for Iran in order to kick off an important regional tour, which he has done several times in the last two years in order to bolster his image as a statesmen (Asharq al-Awsat, January 23). The puzzle is, then, why so many of his followers, including his top representatives, believed that after his return to Iraq al-Sadr would reside in Najaf, possibly studying under an Iraqi-based Grand Ayatollah (al-Hayat, January 13). Did al-Sadr have plans to stay in Iraq and supervise his movement’s return to power? If not, then what are the security implications of his return to Iran?

A careful review of reports from the earlier days of his return to Iraq shows that al-Sadr had plans to reside in Iraq with the objective of playing a more direct role in Iraq’s political and security matters (al-Quds al-Arabi, January 4). Despite claims by his representatives that he is in full command of his followers while studying in Iran, al-Sadr’s decision to reside in Najaf would have bolstered his influence as a regional political figure with religious authority (al-Alam, January 15). His departure to Iran, therefore, appears to be a sudden change of plan, perhaps a somewhat hasty response to the violence that erupted in Karbala, but more likely because of threats from splinter groups within his former militia.

The Mahdist Factions

Although Mahdist splinter groups have largely remained hidden from the sight of security forces, they tend to make abrupt appearances to remind observers of the internal challenges al-Sadr faces in Iraq. Examples of such threats emerged in 2010, when Jaysh al-Mahdi splinter groups with names such as “Guardians of Religion” and “Men of the Sword” began imposing codes of morality and controlling territories in various cities like Nasriya (Tabnak, August 16, 2010). The Ahrar faction, as another example, still remains one of the most formidable challenges to al-Sadr (Aswat al-Iraq, October 17, 2010). Although the cleric’s representatives have downplayed their significance, these splinter groups were likely displeased with the return of their former leader, especially his January 8 speech in Najaf where he talked about cooperation with the new government and peaceful resistance to U.S. occupation (al-Arabiya, January 8). Since most splinter factions began to emerge when al-Sadr began his collaboration with the government of Nuri al-Maliki in 2005 onwards, the Najaf speech only reconfirmed the view shared by many of his enemies that the cleric is a traitor for his ties to the U.S. occupiers and his links with Iran.

However, despite internal threats to his security, al-Sadr maintains considerable political capital in Iraq. The December 2010 deal to join the new coalition government secured his movement eight governmental ministries, most notably in education (considered a vital portfolio by Islamists), along with 39 seats in parliament (al-Jazeera, January 5). During his two-week stay in Iraq, al-Sadr showed significant political clout as Iraqi politicians, including President Jalal Talabani, travelled to meet him in Najaf (Fars, January 15). Among the many official meetings, the most important one took place on January 13 between al-Sadr and Grand Ayatollah Sistani (al-Sumaria, January 14; Fars, January 14). During this meeting, Sistani was reportedly impressed by al-Sadr’s populist agenda, particularly his support in the Iraqi parliament for public housing for the poor (al-Hayat, January 14). The meetings helped al-Sadr shed the image of a radical figure while solidifying his status as a major player in the new coalition government.

Exerting “Soft Power”

In terms of security implications, al-Sadr appears to underline his broader strategy by expanding his “soft power” capabilities (i.e. attaining objectives through attraction or co-opting the opposition rather than using violence) with the support of Tehran. The attempt to transform the Mahdi Army into the Mumahidun (“Those Who Pave the Path”) with a mission to provide cultural and public services to Iraqis set off a general re-structuring of the Sadrist movement into a political force in 2008. Al-Sadr’s latest attempt to bolster his cultural-political credentials may be viewed as part of a broader Iranian regional policy (see Terrorism Monitor, September 4, 2008).  Rumors of his close scholarly ties with supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini and Ayatollah Mesbah Yazadi, a hardliner cleric with a messianic outlook, seem to indicate al-Sadr has grown increasingly dependent on Iran since he left Iraq to pursue his studies in Qom in 2008 (see Terrorism Monitor, February 5, 2008).

Unlike 2003-2004, when he challenged Shi’a authorities in Najaf and Tehran, al-Sadr is now careful to mind the limits of his authority in public. This is perhaps intended to tame his younger followers by respecting the traditions of Shia orthodoxy, a far cry from his 2003 claims to messianic-like authority, which angered the clerical establishment. The long-term pursuit of becoming an ayatollah appears to be more important to al-Sadr than simply counting the immediate political gains he can enjoy by staying in Iraq. One can argue that despite his possible plans to stay in Najaf, al-Sadr is determined to become a recognized, high-ranking cleric in the Shi’a religious community with the benefit of access to major sources of financial capital primarily under the control of high-ranking clerics in Najaf. As his refusal to lead the Friday Prayer as a low-level cleric in Kufa indicates, he has no desire to challenge long-held traditions of the clerical establishment and transgress the authority of his clerical superiors and elders (Fars, January 15).

Al-Sadr’s soft-power strategy can be associated with Iran’s “Soft War” strategy, which became an integral part of Tehran’s regional policy in the months after the disputed 2009 elections (see Terrorism Monitor, June 12, 2010). As the Islamic Republic shifts attention to soft structures such as education and religious institutions to bolster its image and influence inside and outside Iran, al-Sadr also appears to follow a similar strategy with a new focus on building political and cultural blocks in Iraq, especially through the Ministry of Education his followers now control. It is also likely that some of his loyal former officers are taking up the task of software training activities in the cultural and educational domain under Iranian supervision. Since December 2010, three of the author’s Sadrist informants in Qom, all former Mahdi Army members, have been called on to return to Iraq after three years in Iran. [1] With the establishment along the nation’s borders of five new Iranian military bases charged with the task of countering new U.S. threats, it is likely that some Sadrist officers are undergoing training in an overhauled military structure (Mehr, January 22; Tehran Times, January 23). More remarkable is the way al-Sadr’s own security force is also undergoing some sort of training and even a refashioning under Iranian supervision. It is worth noting that during the Najaf speech, al-Sadr’s body guards wore grey suits, a distinctive feature of the Iranian security agents trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard’s (IRGC) special security forces.

Conclusion

The long-term challenges to U.S. interests by the Islamic Republic remain complicated by a range of problematic factors, one of which is the continuous transformation of Shi’a Iraqi politics as Washington vies with Iran for influence in Baghdad. Since the disputed 2009 Iranian election, the Islamic Republic’s clerical rulers have become more reliant on the paramilitary force of the IRGC to maintain domestic influence and continue to appear as a regional power. The increasing monopolization of power by the paramilitary-intelligence complex has underlined a major shift in Tehran’s foreign policy outlook that could entail new challenges to the U.S. presence in Iraq. Sadr plays an integral role in Iran’s regional policy ambitions, as leader of perhaps the only Iraqi faction with a major popular base of support in Iraq that could tilt the country toward the side of Iran.

Al-Sadr’s role becomes even more important when it comes to the U.S. presence in Iraq. As for the extension of the American military presence beyond 2011, there appears to be little room for Washington to re-negotiate these terms, as al-Sadr would have considerable leverage over al-Maliki’s government (Fars News, January 9). Despite his call for peaceful resistance against the United States, al-Sadr still upholds an uncompromising stance towards American occupation of Iraq beyond 2011, which ultimately serves Tehran’s interests in preventing the United States from attacking its nuclear sites from military bases in Iraq. This uncompromising posture could entail the re-militarization of the Mahdi Army and the return of militia politics to Iraq if (or when) the United States decides to extend its stay.

Note:

1. Fieldwork, Qom, Iran, December 10, 2008.

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Tuesday, October 20, 2009

Iraqi Forces Detain Iranian Revolutionary Guards Operative by Bill Roggioo

Iraqi security forces detained an Iranian operative in southern Iraq in the latest operation designed to curb Iran’s influence in the war-torn country.

The Iraqi troops captured a weapons trafficker working for Qods Force, the covert external operations branch of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, during a raid in Basrah.

“Iraqi security forces detained a wanted man in central Basrah,” an official at Multinational Force Iraq told Voices of Iraq. “The man, a suspected member of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, carries arms and munitions from a neighboring country into Iraq with the aim of backing the militias and armed groups.”

Iraqi security forces have detained four Iranian operatives since the beginning of October. On Oct. 1, the US military announced that Iraqi paramilitary police from the National Emergency Response Brigade arrested Khalid Masur Isma’il during a raid in the Shia slum of Sadr City. Isma’il served as “financier and recruiter” for the Hezbollah Brigades, or Kata’ib Hezbollah, a Shia terror group that receives funding, training, logistics, guidance, and material support from the Qods Force.

Two other Hezbollah Brigades operatives have been captured in Baghdad this month. On Oct. 3, Iraqi troops arrested a man thought to be affiliated with the Hezbollah Brigades during a raid in Baghdad. Another Hezbollah Brigades operative was detained on Oct. 12, also in Baghdad.

The arrest of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps officer comes just one day after the group suffered a devastating suicide attack that killed five senior Qods Force officers in Sistan-Baluchistan province in eastern Iran.

A Jundallah suicide bomber attacked a meeting between Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps leaders and tribal leaders in Sistan-Baluchistan province, and an IRGC convoy, killing 28 officers and civilians. Brigadier General Nour Ali Shoushtari, the deputy commander for the IRGC’s ground forces, and Brigadier Rajab Ali Mohammadzadeh, the IRGC’s provincial commander for Sistan-Baluchistan, were killed in the attack. In a press release on its website, Jundallah claimed the commanders of Iranshahr Corps, Sarbaz Corps, and the Amir al Mo’menin Brigade was also killed in the attack.

Hezbollah Brigades targeted as pressure is eased on the League of the Righteous.

For over two years, the Hezbollah Brigades has been active in and around Baghdad. The terror group has increased its profile by conducting attacks against US and Iraqi forces, using explosively-formed penetrators and improvised rocket-assisted mortars, which have been described as flying improvised explosive devices. The Hezbollah Brigades has posted videos of these attacks on the Internet.

In July 2009, the US Treasury Department designated the Hezbollah Brigades as an insurgent and militia entity that threaten to destabilize the security of Iraq.

As the Iraqi security forces round up a senior Hezbollah Brigades leader, the US is continuing to release members of the Asaib al Haq, or the League of the Righteous, another Iranian-backed terror group.

More than 100 members of the League of the Righteous have been released since last week. According to a spokesman for the group, talks are underway with the US to release Qais Qazali, the former leader of the League of the Righteous who is currently in US custody. The US is planning to release all members of the group, even though the group is known to still hold a British hostage.

The US has also released several senior Qods Force officers, including Mahmud Farhadi, the leader of the Zafr Command, one of three units subordinate to the Qods Force’s Ramazan Corps. Farhadi was among five Iranians turned over to the Iraqi government and then subsequently turned over to the Iranians in July.

Both the Iraqi government and the US military have said Iran has backed various Shia terror groups inside Iraq, including elements of the Mahdi Army. While the Iranian government has denied the charges, Iraqi and US forces have detained dozens of Iranian Qods Force officers and operatives, captured numerous Shia terrorist leaders under Iranian command, and found ample documentation as well as Iranian-made and Iranian-supplied weapons.
Since late 2006, US and Iraqi forces have captured and killed several high-level Qods Force officers inside Iraq. Among those captured were Mahmud Farhadi, one of the three Iranian regional commanders in the Ramazan Corps; Ali Mussa Daqduq, a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative; and Qais Qazali, the leader of the Qazali Network, which is better known as the Asaib al Haq or the League of the Righteous. Azhar al Dulaimi, one of Qazali’s senior tactical commanders, was killed in Iraq in early 2007.

Since mid-October 2008, Iraqi and US forces have killed one Qods Force operative and captured 17 during raids throughout southern and central Iraq.

Qods Force, the special operations branch of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, has supported various Shia militias and terror groups inside Iraq, including the Mahdi Army. Qods Force helped to build the Mahdi Army along the same lines as Lebanese Hezbollah. Iran denies the charges, but captive Shia terrorists admit to having been recruited by Iranian agents and then transported into Iran for training.

Immediately after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iran established the Ramazan Corps to direct operations inside Iraq. The US military says that Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah have helped establish, fund, train, arm, and provide operational support for Shia terror groups such as the Hezbollah Brigades and the League of the Righteous. The US military refers to these groups along with the Iranian-backed elements of the Mahdi Army as the “Special Groups.” These groups train in camps inside Iran.

US military officers believe that Iran has been ramping up its operations inside Iraq since its surrogates suffered a major defeat at the hands of the Iraqi military during the spring and summer of 2008. Iraqi troops went on the offensive against the Mahdi Army and other Iranian-backed terror groups in Baghdad, Basrah, and central and southern Iraq.

More than 2,000 Mahdi Army members were killed and thousands more were wounded. The operation forced Muqtada al Sadr to agree to a cease-fire, disband the Mahdi Army, and pull the Sadrist political party out of the provincial elections. Sadr’s moves caused shock waves in the Mahdi Army, as some of the militia’s leaders wished to continue the fight against US forces in Baghdad and in southern and central Iraq.

Iranian-backed Shia terror groups in Iraq

The League of the Righteous is a splinter group that broke away from Muqtada al Sadr’s Mahdi Army after Sadr announced he would disband the Mahdi Army and formed a small, secretive military arm to fight Coalition forces in June. The new group, called the Brigade of the Promised Day, has not been linked to any attacks since its formation last summer.

Sadr loyalist Qais Qazali was commander of the League of the Righteous up until his capture in 2007. The group is now said to be under the command of Akram al Kabi, a former Sadr loyalist.

The League of the Righteous receives funding, training, weapons, and direction from the Qods Force. The League of the Righteous conducts attacks with the deadly armor-piercing explosively formed projectiles known as EFPs, as well as with the more conventional roadside bombs.

The size of the League of the Righteous is unknown, but hundreds of members of the group were killed, captured, or fled to Iran during the Iraqi government offensive against the Mahdi Army from March to July of 2008, according to the US military.

Sadr is looking to pull the rank and file of the League back into the fold of the Sadr political movement. Earlier this year Sadr issued a message rejecting the US-Iraqi security agreement and said he “extends his hand to the mujahideen in the so-called Asaib but not their leaderships who have been distracted by politics and mortal life from the [two late] Sadrs and the interests of Iraq and Iraqis.”

The Hezbollah Brigades, or Kata’ib Hezbollah, has been active in and around Baghdad for more than a year. The terror group has increased its profile by conducting attacks against US and Iraqi forces, using the deadly explosively-formed penetrator land mines and improvised rocket-assisted mortars, which have been described as flying improvised explosive devices. The Hezbollah Brigades has posted videos of these attacks on the Internet.

The terror group is an offshoot of the Iranian-trained Special Groups, the US military said last summer. Hezbollah Brigades receives funding, training, logistics, guidance, and material support from the Qods Force.

Both the US military and the Iraqi military believe that the Special Groups are preparing to reinitiate fighting as their leaders and operatives are beginning to filter back into Iraq from Iran. On Feb. 4, Lieutenant General Lloyd Austin, the deputy commander of Multinational Forces Iraq, said that Iran continues to arm, fund, and train the Special Groups, and that munitions traced back to Iran continue to be uncovered in Iraq. Recent intelligence and the finds of new Iranian caches “lead us to believe that Iranian support activity is still ongoing,” Austin warned.

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Thursday, April 20, 2006

Version/ Public Release 0.8.1 posted on Friday, May 05, 2000. Version/ Public Release 1.0.7 posted on Monday, December 02, 2002. Version/ Public Release 1.2.1 posted on Tuesday, May 17, 2005. Version/ Public Release 1.2.1 scored 87 % and scored by an undergraduate professor with academic experience and professional experience. Version/ Public Release 2.5.3 posted on Wednesday, April 5, 2006 and scored 85% by a graduate professor with professional experience and academic experience. Version/ Public Release 2.5.5 (inventory update) posted on Thursday, April 20, 2006.

Keynote Iran (Version/ Public Release 1.0.5) posted on Wednesday, April 5, 2006 and scored 80% by a person with academic experience. Keynote Iran (Version/ Public Release 1.3.7) posted on Saturday, April 22, 2006 and scored 80% by a person with professional experience.

SUMMARY ONLY————————SUMMARY ONLY

Terrorist Iran and Atomic Iran
Roy Mitsuoka
Interdisciplinary Studies, Section 003
University of Texas at Arlington
Spring 2006

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.5 License.

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INTRODUCTION

Threats by terrorist Iran and atomic Iran are multifaceted and multidimensional. Terrorist Iran is directly involved in terrorist funding, arming terrorist, terrorist training, and terrorist support. Terrorist Iran and atomic Iran undermine security and strategic applications.

Understanding Iran requires a sharp and difficult learning curve for the United States, United Nations Security Council, international powers, and regional powers in understanding warning intelligence. “Warning intelligence is everything and underlines everything.” Warning intelligence rests on the capability and ability to gather, collate, understand, and disseminate intelligence. (Helms, Richard. (1987) “Veil: The CIA’s Secret Wars 1981 to 1987.” New York: Simon and Schuster, New York.) Warning intelligence also rests on the gathering of data on selected subjects without regard to correctness. Warning intelligence is also not limited to the gathering of data on selected subjects but some times unrelated gathering of data on unrelated subjects. (Sokolsky Papers. Letter Dated October 14, 1952.)

Warning intelligence is sensitive to informational policy makers and not sensitive to political policy makers. Warning intelligence requires the construction of physical and nonphysical firewalls to protect against hostile penetrations domestically and from abroad. (Johnson, Loch. “A Centralized Intelligence System: Truman’s Dream Deferred.” American Intelligence Journal, Volume 23. Autumn – Winter 2005. Langley, Virginia.)

Warning intelligence would be best at assisting and directing United States security and strategic applications. United States security and strategic applications require policies, relations, and actions with nations, public institutions, and private institutions that have multifaceted and multilateral policies, relations, and actions domestically and abroad directly and indirectly with Iran. Demands of the War on Terrorism to perform, to compete, and to win, require interdisciplinary perspective and interdisciplinary approach.

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TERRORIST FUNDING

Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad receive around $ 120 million or more a year from Iran. Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad are proxy for Iran to conduct attacks. Iran has an interest in undermining United States security and strategic applications. (Levitt, Matthew. (2003, June 9, Monday.) “Smeared in Blood, Hezbollah Fingerprints All Over Globe.” Sydney: The Australian, Sydney.)

Canadian Secret Intelligence Service or CSIS discovered documents that attest to the transfer of $35 million to Hamas from the Iran Intelligence Service or MOIS. Documents also attest to the transfer of $20 million to $50 million annually to Hezbollah from 1990 to 2000, transfer of $35 million to Hamas in 1995, and transfer of $25 million in 1995 and transfer of $50 million in 1996 to Islamic Jihad. Iran in total from 1990 to 2000 sent more than $300 million to Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. (Canadian Secret Intelligence Service or CSIS. (2002) “Terrorist Group Profiler.”)

September of 2000, Iran sent Imad Mughniyeh or Hezbollah International Operations Commander to help Hamas and Islamic Jihad.

December of 2000, Palestine Authority Intelligence Report was confiscated by Israel that attest to the transfer of $400 million to Hamas and transfer of $700 million to terrorist organizations opposed to the Palestine Authority. Around the same time, a confiscated Palestine Authority Report describes a meeting on 2000, May 19, Friday between the Ambassador of Iran to Syria and representatives from Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad at Iran Embassy in Syria. The document also attest to the Ambassador of Iran to Syria demanded that terrorist operations in Palestine be done without taking credit and responsibility. Palestine Authority Report dated Wednesday, October 31, 2001 attest to officials from Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad had a meeting in Syria to attempt an increase in joint activity and operations with funds from Iran. (“Iran as a State Sponsoring and Operating Terror.” (2003, April 7, Monday.) Special Information Bulletin: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies. Tel Aviv: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, Israel.)

June of 2002, Iran President Ayatollah Ali Khamenei met with Islamic Jihad leader Ramadan Shallah and pledged to fund Hezbollah and Islamic Jihad for expenses of recruiting terrorist.

Iran in September of 2000 instituted millions in bonuses for terrorist operations. Intercepted communications and bank transactions from Iran indicate payments to Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad to pay from $100 thousand to $250 thousand for terrorist operations whereas in the past paid from $20 thousand to $50 thousand. (“Iran as a State Sponsoring and Operating Terror.” (2003, April 7, Monday.) Special Information Bulletin: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies. Tel Aviv: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, Israel.)

ARMING TERRORIST

Iran has and is delivering sophisticated weapons to terrorist organizations. These sophisticated weapons are offloaded in Syria and trucked to Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. (O’Sullivan, Arieh. (2004, January 8, Thursday.) “Report: Iran Sent Arms to Hezbollah on Aid Planes.” Tel Aviv: The Jerusalem Post, Israel.)

January of 2002, Israel Navy intercepted the Karine A in the Red Sea. Iran arranged for Imad Mughniyeh or Hezbollah International Operations Commander to purchase the Karine-A, while Haj Bassem or Hezbollah International Operations Deputy commanded the ship that met the Karine A and oversaw the transfer of sophisticated weapons. (New Rule Sets Project. (2004, February 4, Wednesday – 2005, August 15, Monday.) United States and Iran. Online and telephone collaborative effort.)

Karine A was a force multiplier given the sophisticated weapons such as 107 mm rockets, 122 mm rockets, launchers which had ranges up to 22 kilometers, antitank launchers, 120 mm mortars, mortar bombs, PG-7 Tandems, antipersonnel mines, YM-3 antitank mines, YM-1 antitank mines, small arms, ammunitions, and other sophisticated weapons. Majority of the sophisticated weapons had serial numbers that revealed they were produced in and by Iran. The Karine A was not the only time Iran was intercepted in delivering sophisticated weapons, other intercepted attempts include the Santorini, Calipso 2, Abu Hassan, and countless more. (New Rule Sets Project. (2004, February 4, Wednesday – 2005, August 15, Monday.) United States and Iran. Online and telephone collaborative effort.)

Iran also offered the Palestine Authority substantial discounts on sophisticated weapons by allowing them to run hospitals in Gaza and social welfare services in the Palestinian Authority. Using humanitarian and diplomatic services, Iran has and is establishing grassroots operations to spread propaganda, gather warning intelligence, and provide support to Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad. Humanitarian and diplomatic services also provide Iran cover.

TERRORIST TRAINING

Al-Qaida travels through Iran with great ease. Al-Qaida has and is trained in explosives, security, and warning intelligence by Iran and by Hezbollah. One group was trained in 1992 by Iran and Hezbollah trained the second group in 1993. 1996 Khobar Towers Attack was done by terrorist organization trained by Iran and Hezbollah in Beka’a Valley, Lebanon. (Blanford, Nicholas. (2002, August 13, Thursday.) “Report Claims Iran Running Beka‘a Training Camp.” Beirut: Daily Star, Lebanon.)

Palestine Authority legislator and scholar Ziad Abu-Amr has attested countless times that Iran provides support to terrorist organizations. (“Iran as a State Sponsoring and Operating Terror.” (2003, April 7, Monday.) Special Information Bulletin: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies. Tel Aviv: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, Israel.)

Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran Intelligence Service or MOIS trained Hassan Salamah. Hassan Salamah or Hamas Commander was behind the suicide bus attacks carried out between February of 1996 to March of 1996. Hassan Salamah or Hamas Commander was sent to Sudan for ideological indoctrination and then to Iran for explosives, security, and warning intelligence training. Osama Hamdan or Hamas Representative went to Iran and met with Hassan Salamah or Hamas Commander to train in the use of explosives, automatic weapons, hand grenades, shoulder fired missiles, ambush techniques, how to deactivate land mines and extract their explosive material, and how to build trigger mechanisms for bombs. (The Project for New American Century. (2005, August 2, Friday – 2005, August 5, Monday.) United States and Iran. Online and telephone collaborative effort.)

Training camps were under General Ali Reza Tamzar or Commander of Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps in Beka‘a Valley, Lebanon. The training camps trained Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, al-Qaida, and other terrorist organizations in explosives, security, and warning intelligence. Training camps cost Iran about $50 million plus per year. (New Rule Sets Project. (2004, February 4, Wednesday – 2005, August 15, Monday.) United States and Iran. Online and telephone collaborative effort.)

Israel Intelligence Service or Mossad indicate that Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran Intelligence Service or MOIS have established a network of Fatah Cells to serve as current and future Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad leadership. Hezbollah is known for training, manufacturing, and using improvised explosives and roadside bombs. Using improvised explosives and roadside bombs is a skill and a trait of Hezbollah. (“Hezbollah: Profile of the Lebanese Shiite Terrorist Organization of Global Reach Sponsored by Iran and Supported by Syria.” (2003.) Special Information Bulletin: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies. Tel Aviv: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, Israel.)

TERRORIST SUPPORT

Iran has hosted countless terrorism conferences. October of 1991, Iran issued a fatwa after the terrorism conference that any discontinuation of Islamic jihad, for the liberation of Palestine, and destruction of Israel was forbidden and unlawful. Terrorism conferences bring together representatives from 30 to 40 nations and representatives from terrorist organizations.

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IRAQ

Iran has sent more than 2,000 radical clerics into Iraq. These radical clerics bring incitement and propaganda to promote Iran. (Tanter, Raymond. (2004, January 15, Thursday.) “Policy Watch 827: Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Washington D.C., United States.) The incitement, propaganda, terrorism, and threat posed by Iran to Iraq was confirmed on 2005, February 9, Wednesday in which Iraq Interior Minister Falah al-Naquib detained 18 members of Hezbollah on charges of terrorism and Iraq Defense Minister Hazim Shalan declared the country that penetrates the borders, government, and encroaches on Iraq is Iran. (“Hezbollah in Iraq.” (2005, February 9, Thursday.) Agency France Press. Paris, France.)

Iran has and is sending Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran Intelligence Service or MOIS to radicalize Iraq and gather warning intelligence. Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps and Iran Intelligence service or MOIS also have established base of operations in Southern Iraq. (New Rule Sets Project. (2004, February 4, Wednesday – 2005, August 15, Monday.) United States and Iran. Online and telephone collaborative effort. and The Project for New American Century. (2005, August 2, Friday – 2005, August 5, Monday.) United States and Iran. Online and telephone collaborative effort.)

Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and Islamic Jihad have established social services in Iraq to aid in grassroots operations. (Tanter, Raymond. (2004, January 15, Thursday.) “Policy Watch 827: Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Washington D.C., United States.) Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps have established medical centers in cities as widespread as Najaf, Baghdad, Hillah, Basra, and al-Amarah. Social services and medical centers also provide Iran cover. Iran Revolutionary Guard corps and Iran Military Intelligence Service or MOIS have been caught and are building improvised explosives, car bombs, and assisting militias in increasing lethality of attacks. (New Rule Sets Project. (2004, February 4, Wednesday – 2005, August 15, Monday.) United States and Iran. Online and telephone collaborative effort.) Iran is a nation of about 67 million, while Iraq is a nation of about 26 million. Iran population is Persian. Iran is also a nation with mountainous terrain, terrain with countless chokepoints, and in range of and in control of the Strait of Hormuz. Closing or attacking the Strait of Hormuz would affect about 40% of the world oil flow.

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ATOMIC IRAN FROM CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL IRAN

United Nations Security Council, international powers, and regional powers suspect that Iran is developing nuclear weapons. Nuclear development is not new to Iran. Nuclear development in Iran can be dated back 40 years. Given the long experience with nuclear development, Iran has the personnel.

Iran has and could produce weapons grade uranium and/ or weapons grade plutonium in weeks. Iran insists that nuclear development is for civil nuclear development and that nuclear development it is not for nuclear weapons development.

International Atomic Energy Agency announced that Iran has a plant at Natanz, Iran that has and could enrich uranium and plutonium to weapons grade and that Iran has a plant in Arak, Iran that has and could produce heavy water. (National Council of Resistance of Iran. (2003, July 08, Tuesday.) “Iran-Nuclear: Iranian Regime’s New Nuclear Sites.” London, United Kingdom.) Iran has and is acknowledging the existence of these previously secret plants (see Appendix C: Nuclear Fire and Control Plants Map of Iran) after United Nations Security Council, international powers, and regional powers pressure. Enrichment plants and heavy water plants is cause for concerns.

Heavy water plant is efficient and effective method to produce plutonium and to produce uranium. An enrichment plant is efficient and effective method to enrich uranium and enrich plutonium to weapons grade. (International Atomic Energy Agency. (2006, February 4, Saturday.) “Implementation of Non Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” France, Germany, and United Kingdom.)

United Nations Security Council, international powers, and regional powers view Iran as having enormous oil reserves for energy and do not need civil nuclear development for energy. Iran view is oil reserves must be exported at the highest levels to earn foreign currency, oil reserves for energy are finite, and civil nuclear development for energy is infinite.

Weapons Development

Beyond previously secret plants, other nuclear weapons development raise concern. Other nuclear weapons development that raise concern include production and testing of gas centrifuges, production and irradiation of uranium dioxide, production of zirconium, production of uranium hexafluoride, and testing and production of vapor laser separation systems. (International Atomic Energy Agency. (2006, February 4, Saturday.) “Implementation of Non Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” France, Germany, and United Kingdom.)

Missiles Development

Nuclear weapons development requires missiles development (see Appendix B: Missile and Fire Control Sites Map of Iran.) Iran has acquired missiles and missiles technology from Russia, China, North Korea, France, Germany, and United States.

Iran has CSS-8, Musak-120, SCUD-B, and SCUD-C, which have ranges of less than 600 kilometers and are not suitable for the delivery of nuclear warheads. Iran is developing missiles that are more suitable for the delivery of nuclear warheads such as the Shahab-3, Shahab-4, and Shahab-5. The Shahab-3 (inventory between 200 to 300) is being developed and produced by Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps and has a range of about 1,300 kilometers. The Shahab-4 (inventory between 100 to 150) is based on the Russian SS-4 and on the North Korean Nodong-2 and has a range of about 2,000 kilometers. The Shahab-5 (inventory between 25 to 100) is based on the Russian SS-5 and has a range of about 4,000 kilometers. The Shahab-3 and Shahab-5 can handle payloads of about 750 kilograms and nuclear warheads. The Sahab-4 can handle payloads of about 1,000 kilograms and nuclear warheads. These missiles have a circular error rate of between 100 meters radius to 200 meters radius and suitable for attacks on large urban areas and/ or military forces. (New Rule Sets Project. (2004, February 4, Wednesday – 2005, August 15, Monday.) United States and Iran. Online and telephone collaborative effort.)

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ISRAEL

Israel has maintained nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons development, and missiles development since the 1960s. United Nations Security Council, international powers, and regional powers believe Israel to have around 200 nuclear weapons. Israel regards nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons development, and missiles development essential to Israel security and strategic applications. Israel is the only state in the Middle East with nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons development.

Since the 1970s, Iran has and is Israel greatest threat. Israel Air Force in 1981 destroyed a plant in Osiraq, Iraq that could enrich uranium to weapons grade and the destruction set back Iraq from becoming an atomic Iraq. The plant in Osiraq, Iraq was in range of Israel Air Force. Plants in Iran until recently were at the limit of Israel Air Force. Limit of Israel Air Force has changed with the importing of United States F-15 (inventory between 15 to 30) and United States F-16 (inventory between 50 to 100.) (International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2005) “The Military Balance 2005 – 2006.” London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, United Kingdom. and New Rule Sets Project. (2004, February 4, Wednesday – 2005, August 15, Monday.) United States and Iran. Online and telephone collaborative effort.) Israel Air Force has also acquired earth-penetrating weapons (inventory between 400 to 500.) Israel has also been involved in Iraq in training special operation units. (New Rule Sets Project. (2004, February 4, Wednesday – 2005, August 15, Monday.) United States and Iran. Online and telephone collaborative effort.)

Close relationship between United States security and strategic applications and Israel security and strategic applications is well known across the Middle East. Relationship will contribute to an assumption that any attack by Israel on Iran would be undertaken with the knowledge, approval, assistance, and joint operations of the United States. Certain that any attack by Israel on Iran would involve air space currently dominated by the United States and Iraq.

Attack by Israel on Iran would required the destruction of all known plants, all previously secret plants, currently secret nuclear weapons development plants, all known sites, all previously secret sites, currently secret missiles development sites, and personnel. Israel security and strategic applications would be mainly aiming to set back nuclear weapons development and missiles development.

If an attack on Iran were undertaken by Israel, rather than the United States, would be a small scale attack although more substantial than the Israel Air Force attack on Osiraq, Iraqi in 1981. Israel would have to concentrate on all known plants, all previously secret plants, currently secret nuclear weapons development plants, all known sites, all previously secret sites, currently secret missiles development sites, and personnel. Israel would have to have less concern with Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran Intelligence Service or MOIS, and flow of oil.

Iran and across the Middle East would see an attack by Israel as being done with the knowledge, approval, assistance, and joint operations of the United States. This would bring the United States into the confrontation. Confrontation would be of value to Israel, would weaken Iran security and strategic applications. Israel would set back nuclear weapons development and missiles development by Iran and would bring the United States into the confrontation. Iran security and strategic applications might be to encourage Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps, Iran Intelligence Service or MOIS, Hezbollah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and terrorist organizations to act against the United States and Israel and obstruct the flow of oil. While Israel would gain in the short term, the long term would offer a protracted conflict, unstable conflict, and costly conflict certain to end with nuclear conflict. In addition to the problems in Iraq, would create tensions between the United States and Israel, Israel would be faced with an Iran determined to develop missiles and nuclear weapons in the shortest possible time, and increase tensions and alliances in opposition to Israel and destruction of Israel.

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APPLICATIONS

Difficulties have arisen with United States security and strategic applications in Iraq. There is still warning intelligence that terrorist Iran and atomic Iran has and is a greater threat to United States. View of Iraq before March of 2003, provided by political policymakers care of their versions of warning intelligence, United States security and strategic applications done in Iraq would lead to less warning intelligence on and from Iran.

United States security and strategic applications in Iraq has not been done. Iran has greater influence, a consequence of Iraq. A consequence also of Iraq is pressures of protracted conflicts, unstable conflicts, and costly conflicts will shift and change relationships between terrorist Iran, atomic Iran, domestic opposition in Iran, and al-Qaida to that of the United States is enemy. While United States security and strategic studies and applications may not be opposed to options other than attack to ensure Iran does not become an atomic Iran, must recognize attack as an option and is likely to be undertaken at some time.

Iran Army is composed of about 350,000 personnel and Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps is composed of about 120,000 personnel. Iran Army is poorly trained and equipped, while the Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps is trained and equipped well. Iran Army is also composed of T-72 (inventory between 700 to 1,000,) armored fighting vehicles (inventory between 1,000 to 1,300,) and artillery pieces (inventory between 2,500 to 3,000.)

Iran Air Force is composed of MiG-29 (inventory between 30 to 40,) China F-6 (inventory between 20 to 30,) China F-7 (inventory between 20 to 30,) French Mirage F-1 (between 5 to 10,) and United States F-14 (inventory between 10 to 20.)

To mirror the force to personnel, inventory, and population ratio used in Iraq, Iran would require around 500,000 personnel.

An attack on Iran by United States would be the start of a protracted confrontation that would involve Iraq, Lebanon, Israel, and the West Gulf States. An attack by Israel, initially on a small scale, would involve the United States and also mark the start of a protracted confrontation. Although an attack by United States and/ or Israel would damage Iran missile development and Iran nuclear weapons development, numerous responses from terrorist Iran would be possible making a protracted conflict, unstable conflict, and costly conflict certain.

Iran response also might be to isolate itself from the United Nations, international powers, and regional powers and engage in missiles development and nuclear weapons development on a confrontation pace. This would lead to further actions against Iran from the United Nations Security Council, international powers, and regional powers, establishing a dangerous cycle of confrontation.

At the same time, negotiations with Iran have lead to an impasse and Iran has ruled out any negotiations that would limit missiles development, nuclear weapons development, Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps, and Iran Intelligence Service or MOIS. Israel also will not sit by and allow Iran to take advantage of negotiations. (Project Daniel. (Wednesday, May 4, 2005) “Project Daniel: Israel’s Strategic Defense.” Israel.)

Iraq confrontation was to become a democratic republic and a free market state, view of Iraq before March of 2003, instead Iraq has become a protracted conflict, unstable conflict, and costly conflict. Iraq may not prevent a United States attack and/ or an Israel attack on Iran, even though consequences would be greater than Iraq. Based upon warning intelligence, interdisciplinary perspective, and interdisciplinary approach conclusion is that an attack on Iran in relation to current events is a dangerous option that should not be considered at this time. Alternative options must be sought.

Alternative options must also have agility. United States must lay the foundation for accelerating pace of innovation in United States security and strategic applications by focusing on ways to improve clarity of policy making, greater accountability in policy making, and reduce layers in policy making. United States must also utilize existing expertise from warning intelligence and warning intelligence must be sensitive to informational policy making. (New Rule Sets Project. (2004, February 4, Wednesday – 2005, August 15, Monday.) United States and Iran. Online and telephone collaborative effort.)

An alternative option that has agility to halt terrorist Iran and atomic Iran is to sponsor domestic opposition. Sponsoring domestic opposition has worked in the past for United States security and strategic applications. In the 1980s, the Central Intelligence Agency or CIA assisted the Polish Solidarity Movement or PSM to be able to function as a domestic and international opposition to Russia, despite martial law and opposition by Komitet Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti or KGB. The applications took about nine years.

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APPENDIX (SEE IRAN)

2001. Map by The Investigative Project, Used by Permission.

2001. Map by The Investigative Project, Used by Permission.

2001. Map by The Investigative Project, Used by Permission.

2001. Map by The Investigative Project, Used by Permission.

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SOURCES

1) Blanford, Nicholas. (2002, August 13, Thursday.) “Report Claims Iran Running Beka‘a Training Camp.” Beirut: Daily Star, Lebanon.

2) Canadian Secret Intelligence Service or CSIS. (2002) “Terrorist Group Profiler.”

3) Clarke, Richard. (2001.) “Strategy for Eliminating the Threat from the Jihadist Networks of al-Qeada: Status and Prospects.” National Security Council. Washington D.C., United States.

4) Debka File. (2005, April 5, Tuesday – 2005, May 2, Monday.) United States and Iran. Online collaborative effort.

5) Helms, Richard. (1987) “Veil: The CIA’s Secret Wars 1981 to 1987.” New York: Simon and Schuster, New York.

6) “Hezbollah: Profile of the Lebanese Shiite Terrorist Organization of Global Reach Sponsored by Iran and Supported by Syria.” (2003.) Special Information Bulletin: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies. Tel Aviv: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, Israel.

7) “Hezbollah in Iraq.” (2005, February 9, Thursday.) Agency France Press. Paris, France.

8) International Atomic Energy Agency. (2006, February 4, Saturday.) “Implementation of Non Proliferation Treaty Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran.” France, Germany, and United Kingdom.

9) International Institute for Strategic Studies. (2005) “The Military Balance 2005 – 2006.” London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, United Kingdom.

10) “Iran as a State Sponsoring and Operating Terror.” (2003, April 7, Monday.) Special Information Bulletin: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies. Tel Aviv: Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Center for Special Studies, Israel.

11) Levitt, Matthew. (2003, June 9, Monday.) “Smeared in Blood, Hezbollah Fingerprints All Over Globe.” Sydney: The Australian, Sydney.

12) Newsline. (2002, August 8, Thursday.) “Iran Establishes Rocket Training Centers in Lebanon.” Middle East.

13) Greenberg, Maurice. (2002) “Terrorist Financing: Report of an Independent Task Force Sponsored by the Council on Foreign Relations.” The Council on Foreign Relations. Washington D.C., United States.

14) Johnson, Loch. “A Centralized Intelligence System: Truman’s Dream Deferred.” American Intelligence Journal, Volume 23. Autumn – Winter 2005. Langley, Virginia.

15) New Rule Sets Project. (2004, February 4, Wednesday – 2005, August 15, Monday.) United States and Iran. Online and telephone collaborative effort.

16) O’Sullivan, Arieh. (2004, January 8, Thursday.) “Report: Iran Sent Arms to Hezbollah on Aid Planes.” Tel Aviv: The Jerusalem Post, Israel.

17) Sokolsky Papers. Letter Dated October 14, 1952.

18) Tanter, Raymond. (2004, January 15, Thursday.) “Policy Watch 827: Iran’s Threat to Coalition Forces in Iraq.” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Washington D.C., United States.

19) The Project for New American Century. (2005, August 2, Friday – 2005, August 5, Monday.) United States and Iran. Online and telephone collaborative effort.

20) United States House of Representatives. (2006, February 16, Thursday.) “House.Congress.Resolution.341: A Concurrent Resolution Condemning the Government of Iran for Violating Its International Nuclear Nonproliferation Obligations and Expressing Support for Efforts to Report Iran to the United Nations Security Council.” Washington D.C., United States.

21) United States District Court for the District of Columbia. (2002.) “Susan Weinstein VS Iran.” Civil Action Number 00-2601.